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2 THE LAFFER CURVE IN AN INCOMPLETE–MARKET ECONOMY
The Laffer curve, i.e. the inverted-U-shaped relation between fiscal revenues and tax
rates, has often been a key motivation for fiscal reforms. The best known example was
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. Driven by the belief that the US were lying on
the prohibitive part of the Laffer curve, the Reagan administration engineered a major
tax cut, expected to be self-financed. While the actual location of the US along the Laffer
curve subsequently raised controversies1, the Laffer curve concept has figured promi-
nently in policy debates ever since. Against the current backdrop of fiscal consolidation,
it has become even more relevant.
In this paper, we study issues related to the shape of the Laffer curve in the context
of a neoclassical growth model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous, liquidity-
constrained agents (IM for short in the remainder). There are at least two reasons why
the shape of this curve might change in such an environment. First, because of market
incompleteness and liquidity constraints, agents self-insure by accumulating more assets
(Aiyagari, 1994) and supplying more labor (Pijoan-Mas, 2006) than in a complete-market
(CM) setup. As a consequence, the fiscal bases prove to be less tax-elastic than in a CM
context, thus pushing potentially the top of the Laffer curve farther to the right. Second,
and more importantly, the after-tax interest rate’s response to tax changes will not a priori
be invariant to which of public debt or transfers are varied to balance the government
budget constraint as taxes are varied, as opposed to a CM setup in which the after-tax
interest rate would be invariant to debt and transfers. This is so because public debt
and transfers offer different partial insurance to households, thus altering in different
manners their incentive to self-insure. In such a setup, we argue, there is no sense in
which one can define a Laffer curve irrespective of which variable is chosen to balance
the government budget constraint.
To address this issue, we introduce the concept of conditional Laffer curves. Holding
public debt constant, we let transfers vary over a predetermined range and adjust one
of the different tax rates considered in the analysis to balance the government budget
constraint. This yields a relation linking fiscal revenues to the tax rate conditional on
transfers. Holding transfers constant and varying debt, we can define similarly a Laffer
curve conditional on public debt. As we show, in a CM setup, the two conditional Laffer
curves coincide exactly, which is the mere reflection of the irrelevance of public debt and
transfers for the equilibrium allocation and price system.2 In an IM setup, however, the
picture changes radically.
1See e.g. Feldstein (1986) for a skeptical view summarizing much of the debate around the Laffer curve
at that time. See also Blinder (1981).
2In other words, given a change in distortionary taxes, the resulting allocation does not depend on
transfers and/or public debt, which is just Ricardian equivalence at play.
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While the Laffer curve conditional on transfers has the traditional inverted-U shape,
its counterpart conditional on debt looks like a horizontal S. In this case, there can be
one, two, or three tax rates compatible with a given level of fiscal revenues. The regular
part of this curve (the one which indeed looks like an inverted U) is associated with
positive government debt while the odd part (the one which makes the curve look like a
horizontal S) is associated with negative debt levels.
To understand this odd shape, consider a simplified setup with only labor income
taxes and constant shares of government consumption and transfers in output. The de-
rivative of fiscal revenues as a share of GDP with respect to the debt-output ratio is the
sum of two terms: (i) the interest rate and (ii) a multiplicative term combining the debt-
output ratio and the sensitivity of the real interest rate to this ratio. In a CM model, this
multiplicative term is zero because the interest rate is invariant to the debt-output ratio.
In an IM setup however, as shown in Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), public debt crowds
out physical capital in households portfolio, so that the interest rate increases with the
debt-output ratio. As a consequence, the sign of the derivative of fiscal revenues (as a
share of GDP) with respect to the debt-output ratio depends on the sign of public debt,
as does the sign of the derivative of the labor income tax with respect to the debt-output
ratio. For positive debt levels, these derivatives are positive. However, for sufficiently
negative debt levels, they are negative. At the same time, since debt crowds out physical
capital, output will decline with the debt-output ratio. The level of fiscal revenues being
the product of output and the the share of fiscal revenues in output, we obtain that fiscal
revenues first decline with debt, then increase, and then decline again. Combined with
the non-monotonic response of the labor income tax, this translates into a horizontal-S
shape of the Laffer curve.
To explore quantitatively these issues, we consider a neoclassical model along the lines
of Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) and Flode´n (2001). In this economy, households are
subject to persistent, uninsurable, idiosyncratic productivity shocks and face a borrowing
constraint. The model includes distortionary taxes on labor, capital, and consumption.
These taxes are used to finance a constant share of government consumption in output,
lump-sum transfers, and interest repayments on accumulated debt.3 The model is cali-
brated to the US economy to mimic great ratios as well as moments related to the wealth
distribution, using the method devised by Domeij and Heathcote (2004) and Heathcote
(2005). As in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), we then study the steady-state conditional Laffer
curves associated with each of the three tax considered.
3A nice feature of our setup is that it nests the standard neoclassical model. Setting the variance of
idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks to zero and eliminating the borrowing constraint, our model boils
down to the standard neoclassical model with distortionary taxation. This makes easier a quantitative
comparison of the two versions.
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Our main quantitative findings are the following. First, when transfers are varied,
the Laffer curves in the IM economy look broadly like their CM counterparts. In our
benchmark calibration, the revenue-maximizing labor income tax rate is 50 percent, com-
pared to a CM counterpart equal to 49 percent. For the capital income tax, the revenue-
maximizing tax is equal to 58 percent, as opposed to 53 percent in the CM economy.
Second, when debt is varied instead of transfers, the local maximum of fiscal revenues
in the regular part is associated with a labor income tax rate equal to 56 percent. For
the capital income tax, the local revenue-maximizing tax rate in the regular part of the
Laffer curve is about 51 percent. Both for capital and labor income taxes, though, higher
revenues could be reached at lower taxes in the odd part of the curve. We also find no
Laffer effect for consumption taxes. However, even for consumption taxes, when debt is
varied, we obtain an odd portion of the Laffer curve. Thus, for all three taxes considered
in the paper, there exist two levels of fiscal revenues associated with a given tax rate in
the odd part of the curve: A high (resp. low) level related to negative (resp. positive)
public debt.
Our results also have the corollary implication that the Laffer curves (conditional on
transfers) are not invariant to the level of public indebtedness. This is potentially very
important in the current context of high public debt-output ratios in the US and other
advanced economies. It turns out that the Laffer curves are only mildly affected by the
debt-output ratio, provided the latter is positive. However, for negative levels of public
debt, e.g. as in Norway and Sweden (with net debt to GDP amounting to −165.5 percent
and −17.6 percent, respectively, according to International Monetary Fund, 2013), we
find that the Laffer curves can be significantly higher than their benchmark counterparts,
especially when it comes to capital income taxes.
Finally, we ask whether the odd portions of the Laffer curves conditional on debt is
relevant from a policy point of view. To answer this, we compute the welfare maximizing
taxes and debt-output ratios. As in Ro¨hrs and Winter (2010), we obtain that the optimal
debt-output ratio is negative, translating into optimal tax rates which precisely lie on the
odd portions of the Laffer curves associated with each of the three tax rates considered.
Thus, the odd part of the Laffer curves is not just a theoretical curiosity. At the same time,
as one might argue, the exact optimal quantity of debt crucially depends on the stochastic
properties of idiosyncratic shocks. However, we show in our robustness analysis that the
odd portions of the Laffer curves are robust to alternative specifications of idiosyncratic
shocks.
This paper is related to previous studies investigating taxation and/or public debt in
an IM setup. A first strand, exemplified by Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) and Flode´n
(2001), established that a proportional income tax rate changes non-monotonically with
debt. However, this literature did not explore how this feature could impact on the shape
THE LAFFER CURVE IN AN INCOMPLETE–MARKET ECONOMY 5
of the Laffer curve. Ro¨hrs and Winter (2010) extended recently this analysis to a carefully
calibrated multi-tax environment. However, they too ignored the implications for the
Laffer curve. Our paper complements this literature by focussing on how the conditional
Laffer curve changes as debt or transfers are varied. A second strand has explored the
Laffer effect in the context of IM models. For example, Flode´n and Linde´ (2001) found
that the Laffer curve peaks when labor income tax is approximatively 50 percent or more.
However, their analysis abstracts from public debt. More recently, Ljungqvist and Sar-
gent (2008) and Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010) revisited in an IM setup the effects
of labor taxation studied by Prescott (2004). Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008) and Alonso-
Ortiz and Rogerson (2010) compared the Laffer curves under IM and CM. Focusing on
labor income taxes, they obtained that the prohibitive part of the Laffer curve in the IM
case differs only mildly from what obtains in the CM version of their model. However,
they too abstract from government debt. Our paper complements these works by insist-
ing more on the role of public debt and by considering various forms of distortionary
taxes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 1, we expound the IM model
and define the steady-state equilibrium under study. We introduce formally the concept
of conditional Laffer curves. Section 2 is devoted to the quantitative results. We first
discuss our calibration strategy and then explore the extent to which the Laffer curves
change when computed in an IM model. Section 3 explores the robustness of our results
to alternative assumptions on government consumption and on the stochastic process for
idiosyncratic shocks. The last section briefly concludes.
1. THE MODEL
In this section, we describe the model economy and define the associated steady-state
equilibrium. We then discuss how to construct Laffer curves in this setup. In particular,
we insist on the dependence of the Laffer curve on which of public debt or transfers is
varied when taxes are varied.
1.1. Environment. We consider a discrete-time economy without aggregate risk. Time is
indexed by t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. The final good Yt, which we take as the numeraire, is produced
by competitive firms, according to the Cobb-Douglas technology
Yt = Kθt (ZtNt)
1−θ,
where θ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the elasticity of production with respect to capital, Kt and Nt
are the inputs of physical capital and efficient labor, respectively, and Zt is an exogenous
technical progress index, evolving according to Zt+1 = (1 + γ)Zt with Z0 = 1, γ >
0. Firms rent capital and efficient labor on competitive markets, at rates rt + δ and wt,
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respectively, where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the depreciation rate of physical capital, wt is the wage
rate, and rt is the interest rate.
The economy is inhabited by a continuum of agents, of measure one. Each agent’s
time endowment is normalized to 1 and can be allocated to market work ht or to leisure
1− ht. Agents have preferences over consumption ct and leisure defined by
E0
{
∞
∑
t=0
βt[η log(ct) + (1− η) log(1− ht)]
}
with ct ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ ht ≤ 1. Here β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, E0{·} is the
mathematical expectation conditioned on the individual state at date t = 0, and η ∈ (0, 1)
is the relative weight of consumption in utility.
In each period, households receive an uninsurable shock st > 0 to their labor produc-
tivity. These shocks are assumed to be i.i.d. across agents and evolve over time according
to a Markov process, with bounded support S and stationary transition function Q(s, s′).4
These idiosyncratic productivity shocks are normalized so that the unconditional mean
of their logarithm is equal to zero, i.e. E{log(s)} = 0. An individual agent’s efficient
labor is thus stht, with corresponding labor earnings given by (1− τN)wtstht, where τN
denotes the labor income tax. In addition, agents self-insure by accumulating at units of
assets which pay the after-tax rate of return (1− τA)rt, where τA denotes the capital in-
come tax. These assets can consist of units of physical capital and/or government bonds.
Once arbitrage opportunities have been ruled out, each asset has the same rate of return.
Also, agents must pay a consumption tax τC. Finally, they receive lump-sum transfers Tt.
Thus, an agent’s budget constraint is
(1+ τC)ct + at+1 ≤ (1− τN)wtstht + (1− τA)rtat + Tt.
As in Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), borrowing is exogenously restricted by the follow-
ing constraint
at+1 ≥ 0.
There is finally a government in the economy. The government issues debt Bt+1, col-
lects tax revenues, rebates transfers, and consumes Gt units of final good. The associated
budget constraint is given by
Bt+1 = (1+ rt)Bt + Tt + Gt − (τArt At + τNwtNt + τCCt)
where Ct and At denote aggregate (per capita) consumption and assets held by the agents,
respectively.
4The transition Q has the following interpretation: for all s ∈ S and for all S0 ∈ S , where S denotes
the Borel subsets of S , Q(s,S0) is the probability that next period’s individual productivity lies in S0 when
current productivity is s.
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1.2. Equilibrium Defined. In the remainder of this paper, we focus exclusively on the
steady state of an appropriately de-trended version of the above economy. Growing vari-
ables are de-trended by dividing them by Yt. De-trended variables are referred to with
a hat. In the benchmark specification, the ratio of government consumption to output Gˆ
is constant. In the robustness section, we also consider an alternative case in which the
level of government consumption (in deviation from Zt) is constant.
We let A denote the set of possible values for assets aˆ and let the joint distribution of
aˆ and individual productivity s across agents be denoted x(aˆ, s). Thus, for all A0 × S0 ∈
A ×S , x(A0,S0) is the mass of agents with assets in A0 and idiosyncratic productivity
in S0, where A ×S denotes the Borel subsets of A× S .
We can now write an agent’s problem in recursive form
v(aˆ, s) = max
cˆ,h,aˆ′
{
η log(cˆ) + (1− η) log(1− h) + β
∫
S
v(aˆ′, s′)Q(s, ds′)
}
s.t. (1+ τC)cˆ + (1+ γ)aˆ′ ≤ (1− τN)wˆsh + (1+ (1− τA)r)aˆ + Tˆ,
aˆ′ ≥ 0, cˆ ≥ 0, 0 ≤ h ≤ 1.
(1)
We can thus define a stationary, recursive equilibrium in the following way.
DEFINITION 1– A steady-state, recursive competitive equilibrium is a constant system of prices
{r, wˆ}, a vector of constant policy variables (τC, τA, τN, Tˆ, Gˆ, Bˆ), a value function v(aˆ, s), time-
invariant decision rules for an individual’s assets holdings, consumption, and labor supply {ga(aˆ, s),
gc(aˆ, s), gh(aˆ, s}, a measure x(aˆ, s) of agents over the state spaceA×S , and aggregate quantities
Aˆ ≡ ∫ aˆdx, Cˆ ≡ ∫ gc(aˆ, s)dx, N ≡ ∫ sgh(aˆ, s)dx, and Kˆ such that:
(i) The value function v(aˆ, s) solves the agent’s problem stated in equation (1), with associ-
ated decision rules ga(aˆ, s), gc(aˆ, s) and gh(aˆ, s);
(ii) Firms maximize profits and factor markets clear, so that
wˆ =
1− θ
N
,
r + δ =
θ
Kˆ
,
(iii) Tax revenues equal government expenses
τNwˆN + τArAˆ + τCCˆ = Tˆ + Gˆ + (r− γ)Bˆ;
(iv) Aggregate savings equal firm’s demand for capital plus government’s debt
Aˆ = Kˆ + Bˆ;
(v) The distribution x is invariant
x(A0,S0) =
∫
A0×S0
{∫
A×S
1{aˆ′=ga(aˆ,s,x)}Q(s, s
′)dx
}
da′ds′,
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for all A0 × S0 ∈ A ×S , where 1{·} is an indicator function taking value one if the
statement is true and zero otherwise.
With a slight abuse of notation, we define the stationary level of output Yˆ = Yt/Zt. It
is linked to Kˆ and N through Yˆ = Kˆθ/(1−θ)N.
For comparison purposes, we also consider a version of the model in which (i) we
impose idiosyncratic labor income shocks st set to their average value and (ii) we relax
the borrowing constraint. Notice that in this CM environment, the distinction between
effective labor H ≡ ∫ gh(aˆ, s)dx and efficient labor N is no longer useful since both quan-
tities coincide (up to a multiplicative constant). We thus incorporate a productivity scale
factor Ω in front of Nt in the production function to compensate the CM economy for the
average labor productivity effect present in the IM economy (i.e. the relative difference
between N and H). Doing so, we make sure that in the benchmark calibration described
below, all economies share the same interest rate, the same effective labor H, and the
same stationary production level Yˆ. This is done by defining Yˆ = Kˆθ/(1−θ)ΩN.
1.3. The Laffer Curves. From the government budget constraint, fiscal revenues (as a
share of GDP) Rˆ are given by
Rˆ = τNwˆN + τArKˆ + τCCˆ.
Rˆ is then converted to level according to R = Rˆ× Yˆ. Notice that the level of fiscal rev-
enues R is defined net of fiscal receipts from taxing public bonds return.
Traditionally, the steady-state Laffer curve associated with τi, i ∈ {N, A, C} is defined
as follows. Let τi vary over an admissible range, holding the other two taxes constant.
The Laffer curve is then the locus (τi, R) which relates the level of fiscal revenues R to
the tax rates τi. This definition of the Laffer curve correctly takes into account the general
equilibrium effects induced by a tax change, as argued by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). For
example, a given change in τN will modify x, ga, gh, and gc, so that it will also impact on
all the fiscal bases.
However, notice that in this definition, no reference is made as to how the government
balances its budget constraint when τi varies. Indeed, in equilibrium, we must always
have
Rˆ = Gˆ + Tˆ + [(1− τA)r− γ]Bˆ,
so that a given change in one of the three tax rates is associated with a corresponding
adjustment in either Tˆ or Bˆ.5
5Recall that, unless otherwise stated, Gˆ is constant in all our experiments.
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In a CM setup, one can abstract from these adjustments, as shown in the following
proposition.
PROPOSITION 1– In a CM setup, the steady-state Laffer curve associated with τi, i ∈ {N, A, C}
is invariant to which of Tˆ or Bˆ are adjusted to balance the government budget constraint.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
This proposition establishes that in a CM setup, given a change in one of the three
distorting taxes, adjusting lump-sum transfers or public debt is of no consequence for
the equilibrium allocation and price system thus implying the same Laffer curve. This is
just Ricardian equivalence at play, which, in the present context, manifests itself notably
through the invariance of the after-tax interest rate to changes in Tˆ or Bˆ.
In an IM setup, however, the invariance of the after-tax interest rate does not hold. In-
deed, the after-tax interest rate is affected by the fact that capital and government bonds
provide partial insurance to households. The cost of this insurance is reflected in the
lower rate of return on those assets. When the government issues more debt, it effec-
tively decreases the price of capital, thus lowering the insurance cost associated with
holding capital. This translates into an increasing interest rate. By the same line of rea-
soning, since an increase in transfers also provides partial insurance to households, it
also translates into an increasing interest rate. Hence, it is a priori unclear how balancing
the government budget constraint via either Tˆ or Bˆ can feedback on the Laffer curve. As
a consequence, in an IM setup, there is no sense in which on can define a Laffer curve
independently from the way in which the government budget constraint is balanced.
In order to organize our discussion, it is thus convenient at this stage to define the
concept of a steady-state conditional Laffer curve as follows.
DEFINITION 2– Let Bˆ be fixed and let Tˆ vary over an admissible range. Let τi(Tˆ), i ∈ {N, A, C},
denote the tax rate that balances the government budget constraint, holding the other two taxes
constant, and let R(Tˆ) denote the associated level of government revenues. The corresponding
steady-state conditional Laffer curve is the locus (τi(Tˆ), R(Tˆ)) relating tax rates to fiscal rev-
enues. One can alternatively define a locus (τi(Bˆ), R(Bˆ)) by varying Bˆ over an admissible range,
holding Tˆ constant.
In the following discussion, we will refer to the locus (τi(Tˆ), R(Tˆ)) as the Laffer curve
conditional on transfers, and to the locus (τi(Bˆ), R(Bˆ)) as the Laffer curve conditional on
debt. Definition 2 leads us to the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2– In a CM setup, the steady-state conditional Laffer curves (τi(Tˆ), R(Tˆ)) and
(τi(Bˆ), R(Bˆ)) coincide, for all i ∈ {N, A, C}.
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Proof. See Appendix B. 
This proposition establishes that in a CM setup, the notion of conditional Laffer curves
serves no special purpose since both curves coincide. In the rest of this paper, we focus
on analyzing to what extent they differ in an IM setup.
2. QUANTITATIVE RESULTS
In this section, we calibrate the IM and CM models in order to analyze quantitatively
its predictions relative to the conditional Laffer curves discussed above.
2.1. Calibration and solution method. The model is calibrated to the US economy. A
period is taken to be a year. Preferences are described by two parameters, η and β. We
pin down η so that aggregate hours worked H ≡ ∫ gh(a, s)dx equal 0.25. The subjective
discount factor β is set so that the after tax interest rate is equal to 4 percent, as in Trabandt
and Uhlig (2011).
The fiscal parameters Bˆ and Gˆ are set to match the debt-output ratio and the govern-
ment consumption-output ratio reported by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), i.e. Bˆ = 0.63 and
Gˆ = 0.18. The tax rates are calibrated to match estimates of effective tax rates computed
using the methodology developed by Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994). This yields
τN = 0.28, τA = 0.38, and τC = 0.05. Using these parameters, the benchmark value of
the transfer-output ratio Tˆ is endogenously computed so as to balance the government
budget constraint, yielding Tˆ = 7.4 percent.
To calibrate the stochastic process {st}, we follow Domeij and Heathcote (2004) and
Heathcote (2005). We assume that {st}, evolves over time according to a three-state
Markov chain, with support S = {s¯1, s¯2, s¯3} and transition matrix Q. The typical ele-
ment Qij denotes the probability of reaching state j from state i. We impose the following
structure on Q
Q =
 Q11 1−Q11 0(1−Q22)/2 Q22 (1−Q22)/2
0 1−Q11 Q11
 .
As in Heathcote (2005) and Domeij and Heathcote (2004), this transition matrix implies
that households cannot move between the high and low productivity levels directly, that
the fractions of high and low productivity households are equal, and that the proba-
bilities of moving from the medium productivity state into either of the others are the
same. Finally, as discussed in the previous section, we further impose the restriction
E{log(st)} = 0.
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TABLE I. CALIBRATION SUMMARY
Incomplete Markets Complete Markets Calibration Targets
Preferences
η 0.3398 0.3058 H = 0.25
β 0.9680 0.9808 (1− τA)r = 0.04
Shocks
s¯1 0.2131 –
Wealth held by 40 percent poorest,
0.9 percent
s¯2 1.0160 – Gini wealth, 0.816
Q11 0.9001 – ρ(log(s)), 0.9
Q22 0.9855 – σ(log(s))2, 0.05/(1− 0.92)
Technology
θ 0.3800

Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)
δ 0.0700
γ 0.0200
Fiscal Block
τN 0.2800
τA 0.3600
τC 0.0500
Bˆ 0.6300
Gˆ 0.1800
Note: ρ(log(s)) stands for the first-order serial correlation log(st) and σ(log(s)) stands for the
standard error of log(st).
Given the above restrictions, this leaves four free parameters to be calibrated: s¯1, s¯2,
Q11, and Q22. We pin down their values by matching four calibration targets: the Gini
coefficient of the wealth distribution, the share of wealth held by the 40 percent poor-
est, ρ(log(st)) the autocorrelation of the logarithm of labor earnings, and σ(log(st))2 the
variance of the logarithm of labor earnings. The first two calibration targets are taken
from Dı´az-Gı´menez, Glover, and Rı´os-Rull (2011). In particular, they report that the Gini
index is equal to 0.816 and the share of aggregate wealth held by the 40 percent poorest
amounts to 0.9 percent. The last two correspond to the values reported by Heathcote
(2005) and Domeij and Heathcote (2004). In particular, we seek to match ρ(log(st)) = 0.9
and σ(log(st))2 = 0.05/(1− 0.92).
The calibration is summarized in table I. The procedure described above implies β =
0.97 in the IM economy, versus β = 0.98 in the CM economy. This illustrates that, given
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the self-insurance motive in an IM setup, it takes a smaller discount factor than in a CM
economy to reach the same target for the after-tax interest rate. Similarly, we obtain
η = 0.34 in the IM setup, versus η = 0.31 in the CM setup. When it comes to the
parameter governing the idiosyncratic earning shocks, we obtain s¯1 = 0.21, s¯2 = 1.02,
and s¯3 = 3.77. This means that when an s¯2 agent turns s¯1, her labor earnings are cut
by almost 80 percent, while if she turns s¯3, her labor earnings increase by 271 percent.
Corresponding to these labor earning shocks are transition probabilities which imply that
conditional on being s¯1 (resp. s¯3), an agent has a 90 percent probability of not changing
status. Similarly, conditional on being s¯2, an agent has a 98.6 percent probability of not
changing status.
The solution method is now briefly described.6 Given the calibration targets for the
debt-output ratio and the tax rates, we postulate candidate values for the interest rate r
and aggregate efficient labor N. We then solve the government budget constraint for the
transfer-output ratio. To do so, we use the representative firm’s first-order conditions,
which give us values for Kˆ and wˆ, and the aggregate resource constraint, from which we
back out Cˆ. Given these, we solve the agents problem using the endogenous grid method
proposed by Carroll (2006), adapted to deal with endogenous labor supply, in the spirit
of Barillas and Fernandez-Villaverde (2007).7 Using the implied decision rules, we then
solve for the stationary distribution as in Rı´os-Rull (1999) and use it to compute aggregate
quantities. We then iterate on r and N and start the whole process all over again until the
markets for capital and labor clear. For a given N, the interest rate is updated via a hybrid
bisection-secant method. The bisection part of the algorithm is activated whenever the
secant would update r to a value higher than the CM interest rate (which would result
in diverging private savings, as shown in Aiyagari, 1994). Once the market-clearing r is
found, N is updated with a standard secant method.
To compute the conditional Laffer curves, we adapt the previous algorithm as follows.
We first vary either the transfer-output ratio or the debt-output ratio over pre-specified
ranges. At each grid point, given the postulated pair (r, N), the government steady-state
budget constraint is balanced by adjusting one of the three tax rates considered, holding
the other two constant. Given values for the debt-output ratio or the transfer output ratio,
we then solve for the agents decision rules and for the stationary distribution. We then
iterate on r and N as described above.
2.2. Labor Income Taxes. Figure 1 describes how the conditional Laffer curve associated
with labor income taxes τN is constructed when the transfer-output ratio Tˆ is varied.
6Further details are reported in the technical appendix.
7In doing so, we exploit the special structure of the first order condition on h induced by the specific
functional form adopted for the utility function.
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FIGURE 1. Construction of the Laffer Curve Conditional on Transfers - La-
bor Income Taxes
Note: The benchmark fiscal setup is identified with a circle in the curves above. The plain gray line cor-
responds to the incomplete-market economy and the dashed gray curve is associated with the complete-
market economy. The welfare-maximizing tax in the CM setup is identified with a triangle; the welfare-
maximizing tax in the IM setup is identified with a square.
Panel A (top left graph) shows the relation between the level of fiscal revenues R(Tˆ) and
Tˆ. Panel B (top right graph) shows the corresponding relation between τN(Tˆ) and Tˆ.
Finally, panel C (bottom graph) is a combination of the previous two relations. The plain
gray line corresponds to the IM setup and the dashed gray line is associated with the CM
economy.
Both in the IM and CM economies, the Laffer curve conditional on Tˆ has the classic
inverted-U shape, as displayed in panel C. To understand this shape, consider a simpli-
fied setup in which τA = τC = 0. In this configuration, the government budget constraint
simplifies to
Rˆ(Tˆ) ≡ (1− θ)τN(Tˆ) = Gˆ + Tˆ + (r− γ)Bˆ.
Since Gˆ and Bˆ are held constant, assuming differentiability, we obtain from the above
equation
∂Rˆ
∂Tˆ
= (1− θ)∂τN
∂Tˆ
= 1+
∂r
∂Tˆ
Bˆ.
In the CM economy, since ∂r/∂Tˆ = 0 (see the proof of proposition 1), fiscal revenues as
a share of GDP Rˆ(Tˆ) unambiguously increase when Tˆ increases. As the above equation
shows, this also implies that labor income taxes increase with Tˆ. In turn, output declines
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when taxes rise.8 The level of fiscal revenues R is thus the product of a term which
declines with Tˆ and another one which is an increasing function of Tˆ. This yields the
inverted-U shape obtained for R(Tˆ) in the CM setup.
In the IM setup, changes in transfers impact on the steady-state interest rate. This
is so because higher transfers reduce the self-insurance motive and thus reduce capital
accumulation by private agents. We thus expect ∂r/∂Tˆ to be positive. Since Bˆ is positive
in our benchmark calibration, we obtain that Rˆ increases with Tˆ. For the same insurance
motive, higher transfers also reduce the aggregate labor supply and the capital stock.
This is reinforced by the fact that higher transfers come hands in hands with higher labor
taxation. Since both N and Kˆ decline, aggregate output Yˆ also declines.9 In turn, the level
of fiscal revenues R is the product of Rˆ and Yˆ, yielding the inverted-U shape.
Since, in both setups, τN is an increasing function of Tˆ (see panel B), the locus (τN(Tˆ), R(Tˆ))
inherits the inverted-U shape obtained for (Tˆ, R(Tˆ)), thus yielding a classic Laffer curve.
In the general case, when τC and τA are non-zero, the above reasoning still holds but
must also take into account the responses of Kˆ and Cˆ to changes in Tˆ. These endogenous
responses combine together to define the curves reported in figure 1.
Notice that the conditional Laffer curve in the IM setup clearly resembles its CM coun-
terpart. The key difference appears in the high τN region of panel C. Here, a given tax rate
generates relatively more fiscal revenues than in the CM setup. This is clearly due to the
relative inelasticity of labor supply in the IM economy (the aggregate labor elasticity to
taxation is lower in the IM economy than in the CM economy). This translates into a tax
rate maximizing revenues equal to 50.01 percent in the IM economy and 48.64 percent
in the CM economy. This allows the government to raise 15.56 percent more revenues
than in the benchmark calibration in the IM economy and only 13.77 percent in the CM
economy. To sum up, when transfers are adjusted, resorting to a CM model or to an IM
model to characterize the shape and peak of the labor income tax Laffer curve has only
mild consequences.
Panel C in figure 1 also reports the optimal labor income tax, i.e. the values of τN
maximizing social welfare, given values for Bˆ, Gˆ, τA, and τC.10 In the CM model, the
optimal τN is equal to 4.8 percent (see the triangle in panel C). In the IM model, when
transfers are varied, the optimal labor income tax is equal to 26 percent instead (see the
8One can show that this happens whenever consumption and leisure are normal goods.
9See the technical appendix for figures reporting the response of aggregate variables to Tˆ.
10Given the utility function adopted in the paper, social welfare is equal to
∫
v(aˆ, s)dx + η log(Yˆ). This
corresponds to a measure of welfare in deviation from Zt. Notice also that since the ratio Gˆ is held constant
throughout, we are comparing economies with different levels of government consumption. As in Aiya-
gari and McGrattan (1998), we interpret this as an approximation to a setup where Gt would be chosen
optimally.
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FIGURE 2. Construction of the Laffer Curve Conditional on Debt - Labor
Income Taxes
Note: The benchmark fiscal setup is identified with a point in the curves above. The black line corresponds
to the incomplete-market economy and the dashed gray curve is associated with the complete-market
economy. The welfare-maximizing tax in the CM setup is identified with a triangle; the welfare-maximizing
tax in the IM setup is identified with a square.
star in panel C), close to its actual value (see the disk in figure 1). Thus, even though the
quasi-aggregation result obtained in Krusell and Smith (1998) seems to hold in our setup,
we obtain, as in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008), that there can be significantly different
policy implications in an IM setup compared to its CM counterpart.
We turn now to the Laffer curve for labor income taxes τN conditional on the debt-
output ratio Bˆ. Figure 2 describes how this curve is constructed. Panel A (top left graph)
shows the relation between R(Bˆ) and Bˆ. Panel B (top right graph) shows the correspond-
ing relation between τN(Bˆ) and Bˆ. Finally, panel C (bottom graph) is a combination of
the previous two relations. The black line corresponds to the IM setup and the dashed
gray line is associated with the CM economy.
When debt is varied, the conditional Laffer curve now looks like an S oriented hori-
zontally. In the left part of the graph, for relatively low tax levels, the Laffer curve has an
increasing branch which continuously reaches the usual pattern as labor income taxes de-
crease. This junction takes place in what appears to be a minimum tax level which is close
to 25 percent. Interestingly, the minimum labor income tax obtains for a debt-output ratio
close to −96 percent. Above this level, there can be one, two, or three tax rates associated
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with a given level of fiscal revenues. Put differently, there can be two levels of fiscal rev-
enues associated with the same tax rate in the odd part of the Laffer curve conditional
on debt: A high (resp. low) level associated with negative (resp. positive) debt. Also,
in the regular part of this Laffer curve (i.e. the part that is indeed inverted-U-shaped),
the revenue-maximizing labor income tax is 56 percent, allowing the government to raise
17.83 percent more revenues than in the benchmark situation.
What explains the odd shape of the Laffer curve in the left part of figure 2 when the
debt-output ratio is varied? To gain an insight, imagine once again a simplified setting in
which τC = τA = 0. Assuming differentiability of fiscal revenues with respect to Bˆ, one
gets
∂Rˆ
∂Bˆ
= (1− θ)∂τN
∂Bˆ
= (r− γ) + Bˆ ∂r
∂Bˆ
.
Now, since public debt crowds out capital in the households portfolio, we expect ∂r/∂Bˆ >
0. Indeed, as shown by Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), when Bˆ is large, Kˆ gets smaller,
which makes the equilibrium interest rate r increase. Conversely, when Bˆ is negative
and large in absolute value, private wealth Aˆ shrinks and the aggregate level of capital Kˆ
increases, which makes the equilibrium interest rate decrease.
Thus the term Bˆ∂r/∂Bˆ changes sign when Bˆ changes sign. For a sufficiently negative
debt-output ratio, we can thus observe a change in the sign of ∂Rˆ/∂Bˆ and, since Rˆ(Bˆ) =
(1− θ)τN(Bˆ), a corresponding change in the sign of ∂τN/∂Bˆ.
At the same time, Kˆ and N decrease with Bˆ, so that Yˆ is also decreasing with Bˆ.11
Thus the level of fiscal revenues R(Bˆ) obtains as the product of a relation that changes
sign and another one which is strictly decreasing, thus yielding a horizontal-S shape (see
panel A). Now, given the non-monotonic response of τN(Bˆ) (see panel B), the Laffer curve
conditional on debt, which is a combination of panels A and B, exhibits a horizontal-S
shape too (panel C).12
Starting from a negative debt-output ratio Bˆ, output, τN, and R are large. As the gov-
ernment sells more and more assets, i.e. as Bˆ increases, output and τN decline, so that R
declines too. This corresponds to the odd part of the Laffer curve. In this region, there are
two forces at play. First, as Bˆ increases, the capital stock decreases, thus implying declin-
ing real wages, resulting in declining aggregate labor N. Second, since τN also decreases,
agents are willing to supply more labor. It turns out that the first force dominates. Once
the minimal tax is reached, τN and Rˆ start to increase again while Yˆ is still declining.
11The results are reported in the technical appendix.
12It is important at this stage to emphasize that the odd shape of the Laffer curve conditional on debt
has nothing to do with a pathological behavior of the labor supply. In particular, the technical appendix
reports that efficient hours are a decreasing function of Bˆ that closely mimic the behavior of hours worked
in a CM setup.
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This corresponds to the regular part of the Laffer curve, i.e. that which actually looks like
an inverted U. In this region, increases in τN first dominate the disincentive effects of
taxation, up to the maximal tax rate from which disincentive effects start to dominate.
In the general case, when τC and τA are non-zero, the above reasoning still holds but
must also take into account the responses of Kˆ and Cˆ. These endogenous responses com-
bine together to define the particular point at which fiscal revenues exhibit the odd shape
identified above. This also defines the minimal labor income tax.
The question then naturally arises as to the policy relevance of this odd section of the
Laffer curve conditional on debt. To investigate this, we compute as before the tax rate
maximizing social welfare. It turns out that in the IM model with debt varied, the optimal
labor income tax is equal to 26.80 percent (see the square in figure 2). The associated debt-
output ratio is close to −205 percent.13 This means that the optimal tax rate precisely lies
on the odd portion of the Laffer curve. This suggests that this part of the curve is not just
a theoretical curiosity but is actually relevant from a policy perspective.
2.3. Capital Income Taxes. Figure 3 reports three Laffer curves associated with varia-
tions in τA. The dashed gray curve corresponds to the CM economy. The plain gray line
is the Laffer curve conditional on transfers Tˆ in the IM setup. Finally, the black line is the
Laffer curve conditional on debt Bˆ in the IM economy. To save space, we dispense with
a complete description of how the conditional Laffer curves are constructed, given that
they parallel closely the steps explained before.
In the case when transfers are varied, the conditional Laffer curve associated with
τA has the standard inverted-U shape. It has the overall same shape as the curve that
would obtain in the CM economy, as shown in figure 3. Once again, the key difference
appears in the high τA region of the graph. Here, a given tax rate generates relatively
more fiscal revenues than in the CM setup. This is clearly due to the relative inelasticity of
agents saving behavior in the IM economy. As in Aiyagari (1994), in this kind of economy
where contingent assets are ruled out, agents self-insure by accumulating relatively more
assets (physical capital or public debt) than in a CM setup. This translates into a tax rate
maximizing revenues equal to 58.0 percent in the IM economy versus 53.0 percent in
the CM economy. The government may then raise 3.14 percent more revenues than in
the benchmark calibration in the IM economy and only 2.0 percent in the CM economy.
Notice that the optimal capital income tax (holding Gˆ, Bˆ, τN, and τC constant) is close to
14 percent, as opposed to 0 percent in the CM version of the model.
13The optimal negative debt-output ratio confirms results previously obtained by Ro¨hrs and Winter
(2010).
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FIGURE 3. Laffer Curves – Capital Income Tax
Note: Level of fiscal revenues as a function of labor income tax τA. Fiscal revenues are normal-
ized by revenues in the benchmark fiscal setup, identified with a point in the curves above. IM
stands for incomplete markets and CM for complete markets.
As was the case for labor income taxes, when the debt-output ratio Bˆ is varied, we
reach very different conclusions (see the black curve in figure 3). Under this assumption
too, the Laffer curve looks like an S oriented horizontally. In the left part of the graph,
for relatively low tax levels, the Laffer curve has an increasing branch which reaches the
regular pattern as capital income taxes decrease. Once again, this junction takes place
in what appears to be a minimum tax level which is close to 25 percent. Interestingly,
the minimum capital income tax obtains for a debt-output ratio close to −129 percent.
Above this level, there can be one, two, or three tax rates associated with a given level of
fiscal revenues. Also, in the regular part of this Laffer curve (i.e. the part that is indeed
inverted-U-shaped), the revenue-maximizing capital income tax is 51.5 percent, allowing
the government to raise 1.4 percent more revenues than in the benchmark situation. We
find that the optimal tax on capital (holding Gˆ, Tˆ, τN, and τC constant) is about 36 percent.
Once again, the associated tax-revenue mix lies on the odd part of the Laffer curve and is
associated with a debt-output ratio of −180.6 percent.
2.4. Consumption Taxes. Figure 4 reports three Laffer curves associated with variations
in τC, defined in the exact same way as before. The dashed gray one corresponds to the
CM economy, as above. The plain gray line is the Laffer curve associated with the IM
economy, conditional on transfers Tˆ. Finally, the black line is the Laffer curve in the IM
economy, conditional on the debt-output ratio Bˆ.
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FIGURE 4. Laffer Curves – Consumption Tax
Note: Level of fiscal revenues as a function of labor income tax τA. Fiscal revenues are normal-
ized by revenues in the benchmark fiscal setup, identified with a point in the curves above. IM
stands for incomplete markets and CM for complete markets.
As in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), the Laffer curve associated with τC does not exhibit a
peak, either in the CM setup or in the IM setup with adjusted transfers. In the latter, fiscal
revenues are slightly higher than in the former. Fundamentally, in both settings, taxing
consumption is like taxing labor (both taxes show up similarly in the first-order condition
governing labor supply). A difference, though, is that in an IM economy such as ours,
agents with a low labor productivity choose not to work whenever they hold enough
assets. Clearly, those agents would not suffer from labor income taxation but do suffer
from consumption taxes. Combined with the relative inelasticity of labor supply in the
IM setup, this explains why the government can raise more revenues in this framework
than in the CM setup.
As in the previous sections, when the debt-output ratio Bˆ is varied, we reach different
conclusions (see the black curve in figure 4). Under this assumption too, in the left part of
the graph, for relatively low tax levels, the Laffer curve has an increasing branch which
reaches the regular pattern as consumption taxes decrease. Once again, this junction
takes place in what appears to be a minimum tax level which is close to 1.42 percent,
associated with a debt-output ratio close to −110.8 percent. Above this level, there can
be two tax rates associated with a given level of fiscal revenues.
Interestingly, when transfers are varied, the optimal τC (holding the other fiscal pa-
rameters constant) is 12.8 percent (as opposed to 0 percent in the CM setup). In contrast,
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FIGURE 5. Laffer Curves Conditional on Tˆ for Alternative Bˆ
Note: Laffer curves conditional on transfers, for alternative levels of the steady-state debt-
output ratio.
when debt is varied, the optimal τC is about 3.4 percent (very close to actual data) and is
located once more on the odd part of the curve.
2.5. Corollary. Propositions 1 establishes that the Laffer curves associated with τi, i ∈
{N, A, C} do not depend on the debt-output ratio in a CM setup. Put another way,
the Laffer curves in an economy with a debt-output ratio of 63 percent are the same as
those in an economy with a debt-output ratio of 200 percent or −100 percent. However,
the previous analyses suggest that we should not expect this property to hold in an IM
framework, due to the general equilibrium feedback effect of public debt on the after-tax
interest rate. To investigate this, this section studies how variations on the steady-state
debt-output ratio impact on the Laffer curve conditional on transfers.
The results are reported in figure 5. Panels A, B, and C report the Laffer curves associ-
ated with labor income taxes, capital income taxes, and consumption taxes, respectively.
For each tax considered in the analysis, three Laffer curves (conditional on transfers) are
drawn, each associated with a different debt-output ratio. The dashed lines correspond
to the benchmark calibration, in which Bˆ = 0.63. The plain and the dotted lines corre-
spond to alternative economies with Bˆ = −1 and Bˆ = 2, respectively, holding all the
other parameters to their benchmark value. As before, the circles indicate the benchmark
calibration.
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Several interesting results emerge. First, panels A and C show that for positive debt-
output ratios, the Laffer curves associated with labor income taxes τN or consumption
taxes τC hardly differ. This suggests that a high degree of public indebtedness will not
impact much on the shape of the Laffer curve (conditional on transfers). In particular, for
a steady-state debt-output ratio equal to 200 percent, the maximal labor income tax rate is
52 percent, yielding 15.19 percent more fiscal revenues than in the benchmark calibration,
as opposed to a maximal tax of 50 percent and 15.56 percent more fiscal revenues in the
case when the steady-state debt-output ratio is calibrated to 63 percent. To some extent,
this is reassuring given the current fiscal context in the US. However, panels A and C
also show that for negative debt levels, the Laffer curves on τN and τC are somewhat
higher than their benchmark counterparts. In particular, for a steady-state debt-output
ratio equal to −100 percent, the maximal labor income tax rate is 50 percent, yielding
19.25 percent more fiscal revenues than in the benchmark calibration.
More striking differences emerge from panel B which shows the Laffer curves associ-
ated with capital income taxation. First, the dotted line, corresponding to a debt-output
ratio of 200 percent, is lower than its benchmark counterpart. This means that a higher
ratio of public indebtedness reduces the extent to which the government can tax capital
income. In particular, for a steady-state debt-output ratio equal to 200 percent, the maxi-
mal capital income tax rate is 54 percent, yielding 1.67 percent more fiscal revenues than
in the benchmark calibration, as opposed to a maximal tax of 58 percent and 3.14 percent
more fiscal revenues in the case when the steady-state debt-output ratio is calibrated to 63
percent. Second, the plain line, corresponding to a debt-output ratio of −100 percent, is
much higher than its benchmark counterpart. In particular, for a steady-state debt-output
ratio equal to −100 percent, the maximal capital income tax rate is 74 percent, yielding
10.77 percent more fiscal revenues than in the benchmark calibration, considerably more
than what obtains when the debt-output ratio is calibrated to 63 percent.
3. ROBUSTNESS
In this section, we explore the robustness of our results to alternative assumptions
regarding government consumption and the stochastic process governing idiosyncratic
productivity shocks.
3.1. Alternative Assumption on Government Consumption. As in Aiyagari and Mc-
Grattan (1998), Flode´n (2001), and Ro¨hrs and Winter (2010), we have assumed a constant
share of government consumption in output, i.e. a constant Gˆ. In general, this is not
an innocuous assumption. For example, in the CM version of our model, this resulted
in an optimal tax rate on labor income different from 0. More broadly, this assumption
has strong implications on the tax bases response to changes in taxes. This is so because
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FIGURE 6. Laffer Curves - Alternative Assumption on Gt
Note: Level of fiscal revenues as a function of tax rates when Gt/Zt is held constant. Fiscal
revenues are normalized by revenues in the benchmark fiscal setup, identified with a point in
the curves above. IM stands for incomplete markets and CM for complete markets. The level
of public consumption is assumed to be constant.
it imposes a certain pattern on the way government consumption crowds out private
consumption.14
In this section, we relax our previous assumption and impose instead that Gt/Zt be
constant. Thus as Yˆ decreases, the share of government consumption in output increases.
We redo our Laffer curve calculations under this alternative assumption. In general, this
does not raise special problems, except when we consider the Laffer curve associated
conditional on Bˆ. In this case, we must add an extra loop on the government budget
constraint to make sure that the after tax interest rate is never updated to values higher
than (1+ γ)/β− 1. If it were the case, our algorithm would never converge, for reasons
discussed in Aiyagari (1994).
The results are reported on figure 6. The figure contains three subplots, each associated
with one of the three tax rates considered in the analysis. In each case, we report three
Laffer curves: the one deriving from the CM version of the model, the one in the IM
model when transfers are adjusted, and the one in the IM model when debt is varied
instead. As before, we also report the welfare-maximizing taxes. In those exercises, the
resulting government consumption-output ratio ranges from 14 percent to 30 percent as
opposed to 18 percent in the benchmark calibration.
14Notice also that welfare comparisons are not well defined when the level of government spending is
not fixed.
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FIGURE 7. Laffer Curves - Alternative Assumption on st
Note: Level of fiscal revenues as a function of tax rates when st is calibrated as in Flode´n (2001).
Fiscal revenues are normalized by revenues in the benchmark fiscal setup, identified with a
point in the curves above. IM stands for incomplete markets and CM for complete markets.
We obtain qualitatively the same results as in the previous section. When transfers
are adjusted, the IM and CM Laffer curves have a similar pattern. However, when debt
is adjusted instead, the Laffer curve exhibits once again the horizontal S shape. Several
differences with respect to the constant Gˆ case are worth mentioning. First, consistent
with standard results, the optimal taxes are all equal to zero in the CM model (see the
triangle in figure 6). In the IM model with transfers adjusted, we also find much lower
optimal tax rates than before. The optimal capital income and consumption taxes should
be set to zero while the optimal labor income tax is 4 percent. These values are not even
remotely close to the actual values for taxes. In contrast, when debt is adjusted, we obtain
optimal values for τN, τA, and τC equal to 27.56 percent, 11.00 percent, and 5.21 percent,
respectively. Except for capital income taxes, these values are very close to the actual
values for taxes. In each case, the optimal debt-output ratios are lower than−300 percent.
Second, the Laffer curve associated with τA is now somewhat steeper than when Gˆ was
held constant. Also, when debt is adjusted, the capital income tax covers a much wider
range of values than under a constant government consumption-output ratio.
3.2. Alternative Assumption on Idiosyncratic Shocks. Up to now, we focused on a
specification for idiosyncratic productivity shocks that allowed the benchmark IM to re-
produce key characteristics of the wealth distribution. As suggested by Ro¨hrs and Winter
(2010), such an endeavor is crucial if one is interested in assessing the optimal quantity
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of debt. As a matter of fact, we found that the odd part of the Laffer curve contains the
tax-revenue mix corresponding to this optimal level, which was found to be negative, as
convincingly argued by Ro¨hrs and Winter (2010).
This may suggest that the odd part of the Laffer curve could prove sensitive to the
calibration of the idiosyncratic labor earning shocks. To investigate this, we recom-
pute the Laffer curves using an alternative specification for idiosyncratic shocks {st}.
We follow Flode´n (2001) and assume that log(st) follows an AR(1) process log(st) =
ρ log(st−1) + σeet with et ∼ N(0, 1), ρ = 0.9 and σe = 0.21. This process is then approx-
imated with a discrete Markov chain, using the method developed by Tauchen (1986).
To do so, we allow for 7 states in the discrete Markov chain. Holding all the other pa-
rameters to their previous value, the model now delivers a Gini coefficient for the wealth
distribution equal to 0.64, implying a much lower degree of wealth inequality than in
the benchmark calibration. Similarly, under this alternative calibration, the wealth held
by the 40 percent poorest amounts to 2.6 percent of total wealth. The bottom line is that
under this alternative calibration, we obtain a very different wealth distribution.15
Figure 7 reports the Laffer curves obtained under this alternative calibration. As be-
fore, we also report the curves associated with the CM version of the model. What conclu-
sion can we draw from this exercise? First, we obtain slightly different levels of optimal
taxes, though this is not particularly striking. However, when debt is adjusted, we no
longer obtain negative levels for the optimal debt-output ratio. This is just a confirma-
tion of results obtained by Ro¨hrs and Winter (2010). Second, and more interestingly, the
odd part of the Laffer curve which arises when debt is adjusted still appears under this
alternative calibration. Thus, the mere existence of this phenomenon does not seem to
depend particularly on our benchmark calibration for idiosyncratic shocks.
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have inspected how allowing for liquidity-constrained agents and
incomplete financial markets impacts on the shape of the Laffer curve. To address this
question, we formulated a neoclassical growth model along the lines of Aiyagari and
McGrattan (1998). The model was calibrated to the US economy to mimic great ratios as
well as moments related to the wealth distribution. We paid particular attention to which
of debt or transfers is adjusted to balance the government budget constraint as taxes are
varied. While in a complete-market (CM) framework, this does not matter, opting to
adjust debt rather than transfers can potentially make a big difference in an incomplete-
market (IM) setup.
15We also considered a version in which η and β are re-calibrated to match the same targets as before.
This does not change our qualitative conclusions.
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Our main quantitative findings are the following. When it comes to labor and capital
income taxes, the CM and IM models deliver similar Laffer curves when transfers are
adjusted. The slippery slope is a little bit farther to the right in the IM model. This results
from households using labor supply and savings to self-insure, allowing for a greater
level of taxation. However, when public debt is adjusted, the shape of the Laffer curve is
dramatically affected: The conditional Laffer curve now looks like a horizontal S. First,
for a positive debt, the slippery curve moves to the right as in the case of lump-sum trans-
fers adjustments. Second, for a negative public debt, government revenues increase with
debt. This implies that three tax rates compatible with the same level of fiscal revenues
can exist. Finally, when consumption tax is considered, the CM and IM models exhibit
broadly similar shapes when transfers are adjusted, each of them displaying no peak.
Once again, when public debt is adjusted instead, there exist two consumption taxes de-
livering the same level of fiscal revenues. The horizontal S shape of Laffer curves in the
IM setup comes from the non-monotonic response of tax rates to changes in public debt.
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APPENDIX A. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The complete-market economy is the representative-agent version of the IM frame-
work, where we have eliminated idiosyncratic shocks and the borrowing constraint.
Once growing variables have been de-trended by Yt, the associated steady state is then
solution to the system
Cˆ + (γ+ δ)Kˆ + Gˆ = 1, (2)
(1+ γ) = (1+ (1− τA)r)β, (3)
Cˆ =
η
1− η
1− τN
1+ τC
wˆ(1− H), (4)
wˆ = (1− θ)/H, (5)
r + δ = θ/Kˆ. (6)
Equation (2) is the resource constraint. Equation (3) is the steady-state Euler equation.
Equation (4) is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor. Equa-
tions (5) and (6) are the representative firm’s first order conditions.
We solve for the steady-state values in the standard way. First, notice that by combin-
ing the Euler equation (3) with the condition on optimal use of capital by firms (6), one
gets
Kˆ =
βθ(1− τA)
1+ γ− β[1− (1− τA)δ] .
Having solved for Kˆ, one can use the resource constraint (2) to solve for Cˆ. Then, com-
bining the first-order condition on labor supply (4) with the labor demand by firms (5),
one can solve for H.
It thus turns out that the steady-state allocation (Cˆ, Kˆ, H, Yˆ) and the steady-state price
system (r, wˆ) do not depend on either Tˆ or Bˆ. In turn, tax revenues R depend only on the
tax system (τN, τA, τC), the steady-state allocation, and on the steady-state price system.
Thus, for each i ∈ {N, A, C}, the Laffer curve associated with τi is independent from
either Tˆ or Bˆ.
APPENDIX B. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Given proposition 1, it is sufficient to establish the existence of a bijective relationship
between Tˆ and τi and between Bˆ and τi, i ∈ {N, A, C}, to prove that the two conditional
Laffer curves (τi(Tˆ), R(Tˆ)) and (τi(Bˆ), R(Bˆ)) coincide in a CM setup.
To this end, let r˜ ≡ (1− τA)r denote the after tax interest rate. We thus have
r˜ =
1+ γ
β
− 1.
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Notice that the CM steady-state system implies that r˜ does not depend on any of the
three tax rates considered. Fiscal revenues (as a share of GDP) Rˆ are then
Rˆ = (1− θ)τN + τCCˆ + τA1− τA r˜Kˆ.
B.1. Labor income tax. Let us first consider the labor income tax τN. Kˆ does not depend
on this tax rate and, by (2), neither Cˆ does. It follows that
∂Rˆ
∂τN
= 1− θ.
At the same time, it must be the case that
Rˆ = Gˆ + Tˆ + (r˜− γ)Bˆ.
Recall that r˜ does not depend on any of the three tax rates. Assuming that Tˆ is adjusted
and Bˆ is held fixed, we thus obtain
∂Tˆ
∂τN
=
∂Rˆ
∂τN
= 1− θ > 0.
Now, assume that Bˆ is adjusted and Tˆ is held fixed, we obtain
∂Bˆ
∂τN
=
1− θ
r˜− γ > 0.
The inequality follows from the fact that β ∈ (0, 1) since
r˜− γ = (1+ γ)
(
1
β
− 1
)
.
It follows that the relation between τN and Tˆ and the relation between τN and Bˆ are
both strictly increasing and thus bijective. It is thus equivalent to vary τN and adjust Tˆ
(resp. Bˆ) or vary Tˆ (resp. Bˆ) and adjust τN.
B.2. Consumption tax. Now, consider the consumption τC. Reasoning as above, we ob-
tain
∂Tˆ
∂τC
= Cˆ > 0.
∂Bˆ
∂τC
=
Cˆ
r˜− γ > 0.
It follows that the relation between τC and Tˆ (resp. Bˆ) is strictly increasing and thus
bijective. It is thus equivalent to vary τC and adjust Tˆ (resp. Bˆ) or vary Tˆ (resp. Bˆ) and
adjust τC.
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B.3. Capital income tax. Finally, consider the capital income tax τA. Differentiating fiscal
revenues (as a share of GDP) with respect to τA yields
∂Rˆ
∂τA
= τC
∂Cˆ
∂τA
+
r˜
1− τA
(
1
1− τA Kˆ + τA
∂Kˆ
∂τA
)
.
In turn, the partial derivative of Kˆ with respect to τA is
∂Kˆ
∂τA
= − βθ (1+ γ− β)
[1+ γ− β [1− (1− τA) δ]]2
< 0,
and the partial derivative of Cˆ with respect to τA is
∂Cˆ
∂τA
=
(γ+ δ) βθ (1+ γ− β)
[1+ γ− β [1− (1− τA) δ]]2
> 0.
We thus obtain
∂Rˆ
∂τA
=
θ(1+ γ− β)[βτC(γ+ δ) + (1+ γ− β(1− δ))]
[1+ γ− β(1− (1− τA)δ)]2 > 0.
At the same time, it must be the case that
∂Rˆ
∂τA
= (r˜− γ) ∂Bˆ
∂τA
=
∂Tˆ
∂τA
.
Thus, once again, it follows that the relation between τA and Tˆ (resp. Bˆ) is strictly in-
creasing and thus bijective. It is thus equivalent to vary τA and adjust Tˆ (resp. Bˆ) or vary
Tˆ (resp. Bˆ) and adjust τA.
B.4. Summing up. For each i ∈ {N, A, C}, we found that there exists a bijective relation-
ship between Tˆ and τi and between Bˆ and τi. Thus, the Laffer curve obtained by varying
τi and letting Tˆ (resp. Bˆ) adjust coincide with the conditional Laffer curve obtained by
varying Tˆ (resp. Bˆ) and letting τi adjust. By proposition 1, we thus obtain that in a CM
setup, the steady-state conditional Laffer curves coincide.
